Fire Ships
By John L. Morris
Fire Ships were specially-equipped sailing vessels used as incendiary weapons. I once thought they were just ordinary warships pressed into use as giant fire-bombs when one was needed to inflict damage on the enemy when tactically feasible. I was wrong. A visit to the US Naval Academy Museum in Annapolis, MD yielded accurate information. The museum has an 18th C. Scale Model of a purpose-built fire ship, a part of the famous Rogers ship model collection. The didactic for this model reads:
“Griffin, British Fireship, 1702-1737, Length 94’7”, Beam 24’ ”. 1 1/2”, Crew 45, Scale 1/4” = 1’. Fireships, an integral part of warfare at sea throughout most of the Age of Sail, were the guided missiles of their day. A crew of volunteers would steer the ship toward an enemy formation. At the appropriate moment they would set afire a cargo of combustibles packed in the ship’s interior then escape to a boat towed astern. If all went well, the fireship-by then a raging inferno-would drift into an enemy warship and set it ablaze. Most fire ships were old Fifth and Sixth-Rates, or merchantmen purchased by the Navy. Some like Griffin, shown here late in her career, were purpose-built. Model No. 42.”
Materials required to prepare a fireship for use, from: Marshall, George. Marshall's Practical Marine Gunnery: Containing a View of the Magnitude, Weight, Description & Use, of Every Article Used in the Sea Gunner's Department, in the Navy of the United States. United States, T. G. Broughton and pub. by C. Hall, 1822.
https://flic.kr/p/2owWvJ2
This brief explanation of fire ships would be incomplete without some description of their historic use. Below are excerpts describing a major operation by the British Royal Navy against the French Fleet in April 1809 using fire ships, explosion ships, rockets, bomb vessels, etc. This was known as the Battle of Basque Roads. The narrator is English Royal Navy Admiral Lord Gambier, commander of the Channel Fleet, giving testimony at his court martial for inaction against the French during the battle. He had requested the trial to rescue his reputation, and was exonerated in July 1809. Many sources describe heavy political influences, faked documents, etc. which tipped the findings in his favor. Lord Cochran, a daring young captain and advocate of novel methods, was given command of the inshore fleet, which included the fire and explosion ships. The deeply religious Admiral Lord Gambier apparently detested both methods on humanitarian grounds. Gambier and Cochran feuded in both naval and political arenas for many years, the consummate politician Gambier maintaining the upper hand. Cochrane’s exploits are reflected in author Patrick O’brian’s character Jack Aubrey, and in the popular 2003 film “Master and Commander.”
https://flic.kr/p/2oyajzt
Abridged (by author) Testimony of Admiral Lord Gambier, at his voluntary court-martial, 1809 1
On the 15th of March (1809) I issued the following general order to the fleet :
“General Orders.-When the fleet takes an anchorage in Basque Roads, the starboard division will anchor in a line E. by S. from the Caledonia, and the larboard division will anchor in a line W by S. from her. The ships are to be moored, the anchors to be placed E.N.E. and W.S.W. from each other, with the small bower to the westward, and the ships are to be at the distance of two cables' length from each division. The frigates and brigs are to be placed one mile distance in advance, either towards the Isle of Aix, or the town of Rochelle, according to the direction in which the wind blows; and some of them will be farther advanced after the close of day. As an additional guard against any attempts the enemy may make with fire-vessels against the fleet, every ship is to be held in constant readiness for action, at all times, on the shortest notice; every preparation is to be made, and kept in constant readiness, to resist and frustrate the attempts of the enemy by the means of fire-ships or vessels; and the ships are always to be ready to slip their cables, if it should be necessary, leaving buoys upon them. Two boats from each ship are to be held constantly with fire grapnalls in them on board the advanced frigates, to tow off fire vessels: the boats are to go on board the advanced frigates every night soon after sun-set, and to remain the night under the orders of the captain having the charge of the advanced guard; they are to return to their proper ships in the morning. Two brigs are to be advanced beyond the frigates with three boats, each of which are to row guard in moderate weather, and when the wind blows from the eastward, and a vigilant look-out is to be kept upon the movements of the enemy from all the ships and vessels of the advanced guards. If any of the enemy's vessels approach the fleet, they are to be fired at; and if they are suspected to be fire-vessels, blue lights are to be immediately burnt as a signal thereof. If the enemy's ships of the line are discovered to be in motion, rockets are instantly to be thrown up to apprise the fleet. In either case the frigates will get under sail, and act in such a manner as may be most suitable to counteract the operation of the enemy, and assist the fleet in any way they may be able.” Given on board the Caledonia, at anchor, 15th March, 1809.
On the 17th of March the fleet anchored in Basque Roads, and was moored in a line, as directed by the general order. The enemy's ships lay at the distance of about six miles, in compact lines, and the most distant ship of each line within point blank range of the batteries on the Isle of Aix, with their frigates advanced towards the entrance of Aix Roads. This compact position of the enemy was evidently taken to avoid the shoals around the anchorage. The nearer and more distinct view I now obtained of the enemy's position, confirmed me in my opinion of the impracticability of a successful attack upon their ships by the fleet. I was also satisfied, that the only way of attacking the enemy was by means of fire-ships; which I suggested in my letter to the first Lord of the Admiralty, written four days after my arrival at Rochefort, as follows:
MY DEAR LORD, (from) Caledonia, March 11, 1809.
"…The enemy's ships lay very much exposed to the operation of fire-ships. It is a horrible mode or warfare, and the attempt very hazardous, if not desperate; but we should have plenty of volunteers for the service. If you mean to do any thing of the kind, it should be with secrecy and quickness; and the ships used should not be less than those built for the purpose, at least a dozen, and some smaller ones. Yours, my dear Lord, &c.”
This letter was received by his lordship on the 19th of March, who indeed had anticipated my sentiments, as appears by the following letter from their lordship's secretary, already before the Court; but which I will here recapitulate, in order to preserve the chain of my narrative:—
[Most secret.]
MY LORD,
Admiralty Office, March 19, 1809. "I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint your lordship, that they have ordered twelve transports to be fitted as fire-ships, and to proceed and join you off Rochefort; and that Mr. Congreve is also under orders to proceed to your lordship in a coppered transport (the Cleveland) containing a large assortment of rockets, and supplied with a detachment of marine artillery instructed in the use of them, and placed under Mr. Congreve's orders. That the bomb-vessels named in the margin (Etna, Thunder, Vesuvius, Hound, and Fury) are likewise under orders to fit for sea with all possible expedition, and to join you as they may be ready. That all these preparations are making with a view to enable your lordship to make an attack on the French fleet at their anchorage, off Isle d'Aix, if practicable; and I am further commanded to signify their lordships' direction to you, to take into consideration the possibility of making an attack upon the enemy, either conjointly with your line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small craft, fire-ships, bombs, and rockets; or separately by any of the above-named means.”
"You are to man the fire-ships with volunteers from the fleet, intrusting the said ships in charge of officers of the rank of commander, who may happen to be present, and shall volunteer their services on this occasion. But as it is not likely there will be officers sufficient of that rank to command all the fire-ships, you are to make up the deficiency by such lieutenants of the line-of-battle ships as shall volunteer their services, giving the preference to the first lieutenants; and when the said fire-vessels are manned by volunteers from the fleet, you are to cause their original crews to be received on board the ships of your fleet. And in the event of the said fire-ships being destroyed, you are to send home the said men, in order to their being discharged, furnishing them with such certificates, or protections, as shall secure them from being impressed into his Majesty's service. You are also to hold out to the volunteers, and the officers to whom the command of the fire ships may be intrusted, every expectation of reward in the event of success.”
"In order to give your lordship every information on this important subject, my lords have directed me to enclose to you a copy of a paper, drawn up by Sir Richard Keats, in 1807, proposing a mode of attacking an enemy's squadron under Isle d'Aix. I have the honour to be, my lord, Your lordship's most obedient humble servant, W. W. POLE."
(To) "Admiral Lord Gambier, off Rochefort."
"P.S. The fire-ships are expected to sail from the Downs to-morrow, and the rocket-ship from the Nore about the same time. Six additional transports are ordered to be forwarded from Plymouth to your lordship, and the Board of Ordnance are desired to send a ship, with combustible matter sufficient to fit the said transports as fire-ships and also to put on board her an assortment of carcasses for 24-pounders, and of Valenciennes composition 2 to be used at your lordship's discretion.”
That the service might proceed with the utmost celerity, I ordered eight of the largest transports then with the fleet, to be selected and prepared as fire-ships, in lieu of the six expected from Plymouth, that they might be ready to act with the twelve from Woolwich, immediately upon their arrival. Upon the 10th of April, át half-past four P.M. the Beagle arrived, with the twelve fire-ships from England. When I issued orders to the commanders of sloops and first lieutenants of line-of-battle ships which I had prepared, it was found altogether impracticable to proceed to the attack on the night of the 10th, though much pressed by Lord Cochrane, and it may be considered a most fortunate circumstance that the attempt was deferred; for it appears by a general order found on board one of the enemy's ships, and now delivered into court, that the French, to protect their fleet from attack, had equipped 73 launches, and other boats, in five divisions, to guard it from surprise during the night, and to tow off our fire-ships on their approach; and the tranquility of the 10th would have afforded the enemy full opportunity of availing themselves of this protection; but of this they were deprived, by the very blowing weather on the subsequent night, when the fire-ships were sent in. I have here to notice, that some days previous to the attack, I had, to deceive the enemy, adopted the precaution of ordering out of the Roads vessels of every description, that were not to be engaged in the intended operations.
To assist and support the fire-ships, the following disposition was made of the whole force, in frigates and small vessels :—
The Unicorn, Eagle, and Pallas, I directed to take a station near the Buoyart Shoal, for the purpose of receiving the crews of the fire-ships on their return from the enterprise, to support the boats of the fleet which were to accompany the fire-ships, and likewise to give assistance to the Imperieuse, which ship was somewhat farther advanced. The Whiting schooner, and the King George and Nimrod cutters, were fitted for throwing rockets, and were also directed to take a station near the land; the Redpole and Lyra I directed to be anchored, one near the Isle of Aix, and the other near the Buoyart, with lights hoisted, and properly screened from the enemy's view, to guide the fire-ships in their course to the attack. Thirteen explosion vessels, which had been proposed and prepared by Lord Cochrane, were under his lordship's immediate direction to precede the fire-ships in the attack. Their explosion was to point out a proper time for the officers commanding the fire-ships to set fire to their respective vessels; and to intimidate and prevent the enemy from towing off the fire-ships, the boats of the fleet, under the superintendence of Rear Admiral Stopford, were ordered to assemble alongside the Cæsar, to proceed to assist the fire-ships; and I issued the following General Order, and gave the officers commanding fire-ships full instructions for their proceedings:
"The fire-ships are to proceed to the attack the ensuing night, the exploding vessels will close with the Imperieuse. The fire vessels will move from their anchors at half-past seven o'clock. In running in, they are to have the two lights of equal height, which will be shewn on board a vessel placed for that purpose on the starboard hand, and to leave the two lights perpendicular, which will also be shewn by another vessel placed for that purpose on the larboard hand. The frigates, &c. which are to protect and receive the officers and crews of the fire-ships will shew four lights perpendicular, and the Imperieuse will probably anchor near the Buoyart, and shew five lights perpendicular. If the wind should shift before the fire-ships proceed to the attack, or from other circumstances it should be postponed, the Caledonia or the Imperieuse will fire a gun and shew three lights in a perpendicular position.
(from) Caledonia, in Basque Roads, April 11, 1809.”
At about half-past eight P.M. the explosion-vessels and fire-ships proceeded to the attack; at half-past nine two of the explosion-vessels blew up; and at ten most of the fire-ships were observed to be on fire, the enemy's forts and ships firing on them. Many of the fire-ships were seen to drive through their fleet, and beyond the Isle d'Aix. The night was extremely dark; it blew a strong gale with a high sea, and the service thereby became of such increased hazard as scarcely to admit of a hope of the officers and men ever returning. It is right I should here observe, that, although from these and other untoward circumstances, several of the fire-ships failed in their object, I could not discover (after the fullest investigation) that blame was imputable to any of the officers who commanded them.
The explosion-vessels, conducted by Lord Cochrane in person, also failed in their object, as will be seen by a reference to the small chart I now deliver into court, which points out where two of them blew up: the third broke adrift, and did not explode. The situation in which, and the time when these vessels blew up, proved prejudicial to the enterprise in several respects. Their premature explosion, contrary to the expressed intention of Lord Cochrane, that they should blow up in the midst of the enemy's boats, to deter them from towing off our fire-ships in their approach, served as a warning to the enemy, whose ships were observed instantly to shew lights; and several of the officers who commanded the fire-ships not doubting but that the explosion had taken place near to the enemy’s fleet steered their ships and set them on fire accordingly, by which means several were in flames at a greater distance from the enemy than was intended, and so as to endanger our advanced frigates. In fact, had not Captain Wooldridge, and some of the other officers, wholly disregarding the explosion, taken their fire-ships in a proper direction for the enemy, it is more than probable that none of them would have produced any effect whatever on the enemy's fleet. But although not one of the enemy's ships was actually destroyed by means of fire-ships, yet the terror excited by their approach induced the enemy to cut their cables, and exposed them, by their running aground, to the attack which ensued.
1. Naval Chronicle, for 1809, containing a general and biographic history of the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom…for 1809: VOL. XXII. (From July to December.) Joyce Gold, Shoe Lane, London, pp. 216-224
2. Valenciennes composition, composed of fifty parts nitre, twenty-eight of sulphur, eighteen of antimony, and six of rosin, was a common incendiary solution. The cotton, or other material, was soaked in the flammable fluid and loaded through a hole in the base of the projectile.